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Despite the wide application of the notion ‗European identity‘ in modern 
political studies, its definition admittedly remains vague (1). The main 
reason obviously is the lack of agreement over what is to be considered as 
the basic coordinating factor of this supranational unity. While the inten-
sive process of European unity formation has been underway since the 
1980s thanks to the vigorous efforts of European political leaders and the 
supportive institutional, political and economic frameworks, the sociolo-
gical survey reveals that the number of citizens placing their European 
identity before national is rather insignificant and is gradually decreasing 
not only among the forty-seven states of the Council of Europe, but even 
among the twenty seven members of the European Union (2). 
      Now that the whole world including Europe is gripped by critical 
events, and disintegration is gaining more and more power in parallel 
with the processes of integration, it becomes especially important to define 
the essence of identity in general and specifically, of European identity. 
Admittedly, the present focus on such formal criteria of European identity 
as geographical location, religion, cultural and political traditions, loyalty 
to humanist and democratic values has proved rather unconvincing. In 
this regard, the maxim by the modern French journalist, philosopher and 
writer, Bernard-Henri Levi sounds quite attractive from the outset of 21th 
century: Europe is not a place but an idea. If we adhere to this formulation, 
we should identify the basic coordinating factor of European identity as a 
certain set of value that will adequately reflect the reality. 
     In this respect, it is worthwhile to consider how the question was for-
mulated in Ancient Greece, which gave birth not only to the idea of Euro-
pe, but also to the opposition Europe/Asia, and which, naturally, could 
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not have known how the idea of Europe would develop in the following 
millennia. 
     As known, Europe as a geographical notion is not yet mentioned in the 
Homeric epics. However, Homer refers to the daughter of Phoinix (14, 
321) without mentioning her name, who bore Minos and Rhadamanthus. 
Consequently, the arrival of mythical Europa to her eponymous continent 
started from Crete, while her sons were the first European rulers. 
     The name came to designate a geographical notion as early as the 
Archaic period to denote first middle Greece and later the Thracian-
Macedonian east. It is not easy to say whether the geographical name was 
derived from the mythic name or vice versa – whether the name of a mai-
den kidnapped by Zeus is the consequence of the etymological expansion 
of the place-name. 
     If we share the opinion of M. P. Nilsson, a woman on a bull from a 
Mycenaean seal must be associated with the myth about Europa (3). This 
prompts some researchers to suppose that the term Europa, as a place-
name as well as a mythic name, must have been established already in the 
pre-Greek world. As concerns its etymology, according to the proposed 
Greek and Semitic hypothesis, the term must be related either to Greek 
εὐρύϛ ―expansive, broad‖ and ὂψ, ὀπόϛ ―face, eye‖, or to a Semitic root ereb 
meaning ―sunset, evening, west‖. However, these hypotheses are rejected 
by the authors of etymological dictionaries Frisk and Chantraine, who find 
its etymology either unidentified or of the pre-Greek origin (4). The author 
of one of the latest hypothesis is the renowned linguist, E. J. Furnée, who 
finds that pre-Greek languages are of the Kartvelian origin. He does not 
exclude either that the term in question could be of Kartvelian etymology: 
Kartvelian rcoba, containing the Georgian-Zan *wrc root and also 
Georgian-Zan suffixes –ob and –a for verbal nouns, clearly correspond to 
the meaning of the place-name proposed by Frisk. According to him, the 
term must refer to the contrast the boundless continental reach could 
create against the confines of isles and peninsulas (e. g. Peloponnesus) 
washed by the sea all around. Therefore, the extensive reaches of the land 
were designated by the name Europa to refer to continental Greece at first 
and afterwards, along with the Greek colonization, to the whole continent 
(5). In the classical period it was already viewed as a member of the 
Europe/Asia opposition to designate a continent about whose eastern 
boundaries they did not have a clear idea (6). The core representatives of 
the opposition members were considered Persia in the East and Greece in 
the West. As early as the first half of the 5th century BC, in his reasoning 
over the roots and causes of the Greek-Persian opposition, Herodotus 
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refers to Persian historians who believed that the cause of all was, first, the 
abduction of Io by the Phoenicians, then the abduction of Europa, 
afterwards of Medea by the Hellenes and lastly, of Helen by the Trojans. 
―So far it was a matter of mere seizure on both sides. But after this (the 
Persians say), the Greeks were very much to blame; for they invaded Asia 
before the Persians attacked Europe‖ (I, 1-4). Thus, the father of history 
considers Greece as the principal representative of Europe. The tendency 
of identifying Europe with Hellas and Asia with Persia can also be found 
in fiction. I will cite only one example – a fragment from a 5th century BC 
non-surviving epic poem Persica reads: ―Lead me to another tale, how from 
the land of Asia/a great war came to Europe‖ (Bernabe, fr. 1). 
     Thus Greece, which after the great colonization in the classical period 
established a firm hold in many Mediterranean and Black Sea regions 
thanks to its apoikias/colonies, i. e. the most effective disseminators of the 
Hellenic code, it developed an ambition to be the creator of European 
mentality that would become paradigmatic for others. This, first of all, was 
manifested in political pluralism and the diversity of political systems 
developed in many different poleises. The society faced the permanent 
necessity to choose between autocracy, oligarchy, democracy or any other 
hybrid form of governance. The classical period gave birth to an idea that 
neither political system is perfect and fully acceptable. However, here is 
how Plato, the greatest philosopher of the period and the critic of Athe-
nian democracy, gives an account of his teacher‘s, Socrates‘ death. Accor-
ding to Plato, Socrates, wrongfully sentenced to death, nevertheless rejects 
the opportunity to flee from the punishment, thereby demonstrating his 
respect to the laws and the state judgment, which, despite his outright 
criticism, he credited as the best among those available (7). Socrates‘ beha-
vior conveyed the following message: though democratic Athens deserves 
criticism, its laws, i. e. its political system is advanced over others. The 
most solid argument in favour of this standpoint was that the system 
enabled Hellas, the symbol of Europe in the ancient world, to conquer 
unparalleled heights in artistic culture and analytical thought, the two 
areas where human artistic potential is demonstrated most powerfully. 
The Hellenic environment became the most favorable milieu to foster the 
concept of democracy as a system of values, so logically and eloquently 
formulated in Pericles‘ well-known oration cited by Thucydides (II, 37). In 
Pericles‘ words we could single out 21 signs or key concepts that cover the 
whole essence of democracy. While it is impossible to discuss them in de-
tail within this article (8), I will try to highlight how they respond to three 
cardinal questions: 
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a. What should a society, relying on democracy be like? According to Peri-
cles, it should be 1. respectful of the laws it adopts and intolerant towards 
any threats of violating these laws; 2. strictly observant of unwritten, that 
is moral laws and openly critical of law-breakers; 3. emancipated and 
morally prepared to adhere to state interests when making a choice; 4. 
intrepid and prepared for self-defense when necessary; 5. indifferent to a 
person‘s material status and giving privilege to his/her integrity and 
experience; 6. advocate of sound reason and freedom of speech. 
b. What should a person be like? According to Pericles, he/she should 1. 
enjoy equal rights with other citizens; 2. enjoy personal freedom; 3. be in-
volved in state affairs; 4. be a professional and thus obtain personal free-
dom; 5. have his/her own opinion and be able to declare it public; 6. be 
educated and rich in spirit; 7. observe laws; 8. invest wealth into public 
benefit and welfare.  
c. What should a state be like? According to Pericles, it should 1. act as the 
guardian of democracy; 2. be open to foreigners to share advancements 
and cultivate knowledge; 3. be capable of synchronizing public and per-
sonal interests; 4. acquire friends not through receiving but through giving 
alms; 5. be the guaranty of transparency; 6. be responsible for making the 
citizens‘ free time meaningful; 7. refrain from unjustified militarization. 
This model, which was more or less successfully employed in Pericles‘ 
contemporary Athens and in fact fostered the principles of Athenian iden-
tity (9), could serve as the foundation for the concept of European identity 
in building the so-called European Home even in our times thanks to its 
universal character, lack of any religious, ethnic and geographical 
constraints and contribution to critical-analytical reasoning. However, this 
model is far more difficult to implement than any other because it requires 
readiness on the part of society, person and state. Being well aware of this, 
the authorities of the Athenian democracy were determined not to intro-
duce the system in societies that were not duly prepared. Besides, ancient 
experience made obvious the following: during the implementation of the 
democratic model of governance, the negligence or inappropriate 
realization of even one of its aspects is sufficient to generate anomalies, 
which may often prove fatal. In this case, the democratic system, as 
evidenced by the Hellenic history, may become so unacceptable to the so-
ciety that it may be driven towards ochlocracy, i. e. political chaos or 
tyranny, authoritarianism or autocracy. The discrepancy between the de-
clared and realized forms may result in what Thucydides describes as the 
government of people in word, which in fact is the government of a single 
individual. 
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     Despite the diversity of political systems of Greek polises, at the outset 
of the Asia/Europe opposition, Hellas, which can be reckoned as the prin-
cipal representative of the idea of Europe in the ancient world, opted for 
the citizens‘ broad involvement in the political life and for the consi-
deration of public opinion in state management as its founding principle. 
     Contrary to this, the main representative of Asia, the Persian Empire, 
chose a diametrically different principle based on the autocratic leader‘s 
unlimited power, minimal public involvement in the political life and the 
absence of public opinion, which, consequently, was impossible to consider. 
As I have tried to show in my earlier publications on the Europe/Asia 
opposition (10), this difference is determine not by individual preferences 
or by the historical trend, but by the difference between the mental 
substrate (weltanschauung substrate; intellectual and cultural substrate) 
underlying the Persian civilization on the one hand and the Greek ci-
vilization on the other. The dominant weltanschauung principle followed 
by the former is based on mythological values, which are a priori reco-
gnized as the truth and allow for minimal changes. Contrary to this, the 
dominant weltanschauung principle chosen by the latter is based on 
values fostered by critical reasoning and thus open to regular upgrade. 
     Consequently, the numerous attempts ever since Alexander the Great 
and the Roman Empire, aimed at the cancellation of the Europe/Asia or 
West/East opposition, have hardly proved successful so far. The reason 
should be sought in the weltanschauung substrate, which is so deep and 
powerful that has proved to be much more difficult to overcome by the 
weltanschauung adstrate than has been thought by our contemporary 
political authorities. 
     When we discuss the issues of European identity at the start of the 21st 
century, we can‘t help noticing that the concept has substantially altered 
even in the last 20 or 30 years. Since WWII, the world, and Europe in 
particular, has frequently witnessed events that invite corrections to the 
idea of European identity, or I would say, the phenomenon of Europeism. 
It suffices to look through the six basic aspects of the so-called European 
Political Thought set forth by the philosophers Jurgen Habermas and 
Jacque Derrida in 2003 – secularization, state‘s confidence and skepticism 
towards market success, realistic expectations of technical progress, wel-
fare, low tolerance to the application of force, multilateralism within the 
UN (11) – which were expanded to 14 by the political scientist John 
McCormick in 2010 (12), to clearly understand how closely the principles 
of European identity have approached the Periclean democracy identity 
principles in many ways. The difference lies in the fact that the Periclean 
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scope was limited to such microstructures as ancient Greek polises or city 
state, while modern theories cover dozens of European states. However, 
the Periclean concept is far more clearly formulated and presents the 
political weltanschauung of democratic state more comprehensively. 
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